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Abstract 
We examine the crucial policy question of whether the South African (SA) stock market 
values a dual board leadership structure (DBLS) using a sample of 169 listed firms from 
2002 to 2007. We find a significant positive link between DBLS and market valuation, 
but only in firms with independent chairpersons, implying that the market values firms 
with independent DBLS more highly. Our results are robust across a number of 
econometric models that control for different types of market valuation proxies and 
endogeneity problems. Our findings offer empirical support for agency theory, which 
suggests that independent DBLS increases the capacity of the board to effectively advise, 
monitor and discipline top management, and thereby improving market valuation. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, independent dual board leadership structure, market 
valuation, king reports, South Africa, endogeneity 




This paper sets out to investigate the crucial policy question of whether the South African 
(SA) stock market values dual board leadership structure (DBLS). SA has carried out 
corporate governance (CG) reforms, primarily in the form of the 1994 (King I) and 2002 
(King II) King Reports. The King Reports have generally focused on enhancing CG 
standards in SA (Ntim, 2011, 2012). More specifically, however, the reforms have 
focused on enhancing market value by improving the ability of corporate boards to 
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effectively advise, monitor and discipline top management (Ntim et al., 2011, 2012). A 
crucial proxy for corporate boards’ independence, monitoring and disciplining capacity is 
the degree to which board leadership and power is either distributed or concentrated in 
one person (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Corporate leadership structure 
typically consists of a chairman and chief executive officer (CEO). The chairman of the 
board is responsible for managing the board. These may typically include nominating 
new board members, reviewing the performance of senior management, setting agenda 
for board meetings, and settling conflicts which may arise within the board (Laing and 
Weir, 1999). In contrast, the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
company, including implementing board decisions. A DBLS, therefore, exists when the 
roles of chairman and CEO are performed by different persons. 
SA provides an interesting context to examine the association between DBLS and firm 
valuation. Similar to other Anglo-American countries, SA has pursued CG reforms in the 
form of King I and II.  King II states explicitly that the positions of the chairman and the 
CEO should not be held by the same individual, suggesting that it recognises CEO duality 
as an undesirable development, while DBLS is seen as good CG practice. Therefore, this 
paper seeks to examine the link between DBLS and market valuation for SA firms, and 
thereby making a number of new contributions to the extant literature. First, using a 
sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 2007, we provide evidence on the impact of 
DBLS on market valuation. This represents one of the first attempts at quantifying the 
effect of DBLS on market valuation within a Sub-Saharan African context, with specific 
focus on SA, and hence crucially extends the literature to that sub-continent. This also 
contributes to the predominantly developed countries-based literature on the association 
between DBLS and market valuation. Second, we innovatively show that DBLS impacts 
positively on market valuation only in firms with independent chairpersons. Finally, and 
unique from past studies, we employ econometric models that adequately control for 
different types of market valuation proxies and endogeneity problems.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of the CG reforms that have been carried out and the SA corporate context. 
Section 3 reviews the prior theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of DBLS on 
market valuation. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports empirical analyses, while 
section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Corporate Governance Policy Reforms, DBLS and the SA Corporate Context 
There is a general agreement that the introduction of the King Reports formally 
institutionalised CG practices in SA (Ntim et al., 2012). This started with the publication 
of the first King Report (King I) in 1994 (King Committee, 2002; Ntim et al., 2011). The 
suggestions of King I were heavily informed by those of the UK’s Cadbury Report of 
1992 (Ntim and Osei, 2011). For example, and similar to the Cadbury Report, King I 
proposed an Anglo-American style unitary board of directors, consisting of executive and 
non-executive directors, operating within a voluntary compliance CG regime (King 
Committee, 2002). With specific reference to having a DBLS, and similar to the Cadbury 
Report, it highlighted its role in ensuring that power is not concentrated in one person 
(King Committee, 1994). However, and distinct from the Cadbury Report, which 
explicitly defined the criteria for independence, King I did not clearly define who 




constitutes an independent director (Ntim, 2009). Further, and unlike Cadbury, it merely 
recommended that the roles of CEO and chairperson should be split, but was silent as to 
whether the chairperson should additionally be independent of management. That is, and 
crucially, King I was unable to explicitly recommend that SA corporate boards should be 
chaired by independent directors (King Committee, 2002; Ntim, 2011). Arguably, these 
deviations from the Cadbury Report impaired the effectiveness of a DBLS under King I 
(King Committee, 2002; Ntim et al., 2011).  
Consequently, King I was revised and replaced with a second King Report (King II) in 
2002 with the objective of addressing some of the limitations of King I. King II suggested 
two main changes with specific reference to DBLS. First, it provided a clear definition of 
independence and explicitly classified directors into executive, non-executive and 
independent non-executive directors (King Committee, 2002; Ntim, 2009). Second, and 
most critically, to make sure that there is a balance of power and authority in corporate 
leadership and decision-making, King II did not only recommend that SA companies 
should have a DBLS, but also the chairman of the board should additionally be an 
independent non-executive director (King Committee, 2002). Arguably, this enhanced the 
independence and monitoring capacity of having a DBLS under King II than King I.  
However, the SA corporate setting is distinctively characterised by greater block and 
institutional ownerships, primarily in the shape of pyramidical structures and complex 
cross-shareholdings, but the enforcement of corporate regulations and shareholder 
activism are noticeably weak (Ntim et al., 2011). As a result, critical issues have been 
raised as to whether, given the SA corporate context, a voluntary compliance CG 
framework like King II will be effective in enhancing CG standards in the form of 
providing appropriate checks and balances with respect to top management power, 
monitoring, disciplining, advising and decision-making. Thus, the main aim of this paper 
is to investigate whether the proposals contained in the King Reports relating to DBLS 
have any effect on market valuation in SA. 
 
 
3. The Theoretical and Empirical Literature on DBLS and Market Valuation 
Although a DBLS is conceptually viewed as a positive CG development (Ntim, 2009; 
Ntim and Osei, 2011), there are conflicting theoretical predictions as to its impact on 
market value. On the one hand, agency theory suggests that separating the two roles can 
help increase board independence by providing effective checks and balances over 
managerial behaviour (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). It has been suggested, for example, that 
separating the two roles will make it easier for the board to remove a non-performing 
CEO (Jensen, 1993), which may improve market value. On the other hand, stewardship 
and resource dependence theories suggest that combining the two positions (i.e., 
role/CEO duality) can rather have a positive impact on market value. First, Weir et al. 
(2002) contend that as an insider, the CEO tend to have greater knowledge, understanding 
and experience of the strategic challenges and opportunities, which the company faces, 
than a non-executive chairman that can enhance market value. Second, it has been argued 
that role duality grants a charismatic CEO the opportunity to have a sharper focus on firm 
objectives (Ntim, 2009), which can lead to improved valuation due to the rapid 
management decision-making that arises from the provision of clear and unambiguous 
corporate leadership. Third, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) suggest that CEO duality 




avoids extra compensation to the chairman, which can result in a reduction in managerial 
remuneration. Finally, Bozec (2005) argues that unified firm leadership often associated 
with CEO duality improves managerial accountability, as it makes it easier to charge the 
blame for poor performance, and thereby improved firm valuation.  
The empirical evidence on the effect of DBLS on market valuation is similarly mixed 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Brickley et al., 1997; Weir et al., 2002). Rechner and Dalton 
(1991) investigate the link between DBLS and market valuation using 141 large US 
corporations from 1978 to 1983. They report that companies with a DBLS consistently 
outperformed those with CEO duality. Similarly, Dahya et al. (1996) investigate whether 
the US stock market prefers companies to have a DBLS. Consistent with the evidence of 
Rechner and Dalton (1991), their results suggest that the market values firms with DBLS 
more highly.  
By contrast, other studies indicate that CEO duality rather impacts positively on firm 
valuation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994; Boyd, 1995; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
For example, Donaldson and Davis (1991) examine the effects of CEO duality on 
shareholder returns in a sample of 321 US firms from 1985 to 1987. They report that 
companies with CEO duality have superior market valuation to those with DBLS. 
Similarly, Boyd (1995) investigates the association between CEO duality and market 
valuation in a sample of 192 American firms from 1980 to 1984. Consistent with the 
evidence of Donaldson and Davis (1991), he reports that firms with CEO duality 
consistently outperformed their counterparts with DBLS. Finally, using a sample of 348 
Australian listed firms in 1996, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) report that CEO duality 
impacts positively on firm valuation.  
A third stream of empirical papers suggests that role or CEO duality has no impact on 
market valuation. Using 25 Canadian firms from 1976 to 2000, Bozec (2005) reports that 
CEO duality has no impact on market valuation. This is consistent with the results of 
previous studies (Baliga et al., 1996; Brickley et al., 1997; Rhoades et al., 2001; Vafeas 
and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing, 2000; Sanda et al., 2010), 
which suggest that CEO duality has no impact on market valuation.  
Despite the conflicting empirical evidence, and as has been discussed in section 2, 
King II states explicitly that the positions of the chairman and the CEO should not be 
held by the same individual. Also, it states that the chairman must be independent, who 
bears the responsibility for the running of the board, while the CEO is responsible for the 
day-to-day running of the company’s business. This suggests that King II recognises 
CEO duality as an undesirable development, while DBLS is seen as a good CG practice. 
This indicates that King II expects DBLS to have a positive effect on market valuation, 
and thus our main hypothesis is that:   
 H1: There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between DBLS 




As a result of capital structure and regulatory reasons, 291 firms listed on the JSE as at 
31/12/2007 from eight non-financial industries (basic materials, consumer goods, 
consumer services, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, and telecoms) were 
sampled. We employ CG and financial variables to examine the effect of DBLS on 




market valuation. The CG variables were extracted from the annual reports of the 
sampled firms’. The annual reports were downloaded from the Perfect Information 
Database. The financial data were taken from Datastream. The firms in our final sample 
had to meet two criteria. First, a firm’s complete 5-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 
inclusive are available. Second, the firm’s corresponding financial data from 2003 to 
2007 is also available.1 The criteria were set for several reasons. First, and following past 
studies (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Bozec, 2005), the criteria helped in meeting the 
requirements for a balanced panel data analyses. Benefits for employing panel data 
include having both time series and cross-sectional properties, more degrees of freedom 
and less multicollinearities among variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Second, 
analysis of 5-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may help in 
determining whether the observed cross-sectional association between DBLS and market 
valuation is robust over time, and thereby permits direct comparisons to be drawn with 
the results of past studies (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
Applying the above criteria, the full data required is obtained for a total of 169 firms over 
5-firm years and 8 industries for our regression analysis.  
 
  
5. Empirical Analyses  
 
5.1 Summary descriptive statistics 
Table 1 contains full definitions and summary statistics of all (market valuation, CG and 
control) variables that we employ in estimating our regressions. Table 1 indicates, for 
instance, that Q, which is our main (although as a robustness check, we use ROA and TSR 
as an alternative accounting and market based company valuation measures, respectively) 
market valuation proxy, is between a minimum of 0.72 and a maximum of 3.60 with a 
median of 1.34. The DBLS ranges from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 100% with 
an average of 84%. The alternative market valuation variables (ROA and TSR), and the 
control variables (BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GOVOWN, and GROWTH), 
which we include in our regressions in order to control for potential omitted variables 
bias, also display wide spreads, implying that our sample has been adequately selected to 









                                                 
1It takes time for board decisions to reflect in market value (Boyd, 1995; Ntim et al., 2012). Thus, to 
prevent endogenous link between DBLS and market valuation, we introduce a one year lag between DBLS 
and market valuation such that this year’s market value depends on last year’s CG structure, as specified in 
equation (1) below. The sample also starts from 2002 for two reasons. Firstly, King II came into operation 
in 2002, and secondly, data coverage in Perfect Information/DataStream on SA listed firms is very small 
until 2002. 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics of all variables for all 845 firm years 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
 Market valuation (dependent variables) 
Q  1.56  1.34  0.67  3.60  0.72  
ROA                    0.11  0.12  0.14  0.38  -0.19  
TSR  0.28  0.25  0.89  2.36  -0.48 
Dual board leadership structure (main independent variable) 
DBLS  0.84  1.00  0.37  1.00  0.00 
Control variables 
BIG4  0.73  1.00  0.44  1.00  0.00 
CAPEX  0.13  0.08  0.15  0.66  0.07 
CGCOM 0.32  0.00  0.47  1.00  0.00 
CROSLIST 0.22  0.00  0.41  1.00  0.00 
GEAR  0.32  0.19  0.31  0.78  0.01 
GOVOWN 0.38  0.00  0.49  1.00  0.00 
GROWTH 0.12  0.14  0.26  0.89  -0.44 
LNTA  5.86  6.02  0.48  7.83  4.24 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), defined as the ratio of total assets minus book value 
of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.  Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of 
operating profit to total assets. Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total shareholder 
returns made up of share price and dividends. Dual board leadership structure (DBLS), defined as a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the positions of company chairperson and CEO are held by different 
persons, 0 otherwise. Audit firm size (BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a 
firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and 
KPMG), 0 otherwise. Capital expenditure (CAPEX), calculated as the ratio of total capital expenditure to 
total assets. Cross-listing (CROSLIST), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is 
cross-listed to a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. The presence of a corporate governance committee 
(CGCOM), defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up a corporate 
governance committee, 0 otherwise. Gearing (GEAR), calculated as the ratio of total debts to market value 
of equity.  Government ownership (GOVOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if 
government ownership is at least 5%, 0 otherwise. Sales growth (GROWTH), calculated as the current 
year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. Firm size (LNTA), measured as the natural log of 
total assets. 
 
5.2 Multivariate regression analyses 
Firms tend to vary in the challenges and opportunities that they experience over time. 
This can result in a scenario whereby DBLS and Q are jointly and dynamically influenced 
by company-level heterogeneities, such as managerial talent and corporate culture (Guest, 
2009; Ntim, 2009), which simple OLS regressions may be unable to detect (Gujarati, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2010), and thereby leading to spurious results. Thus, given the panel 
nature of our data and following past studies (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 
2012), we run fixed-effects regressions in order to control for unobserved company-level 
differences. Therefore, we start our analysis with basic fixed-effects regression specified 
as follows: 








111110 εδββα                    (1) 
where: Q is the main dependent variable, DBLS is the main independent variable, 
CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, 
CROSLIST, GOVOWN, GROWTH, INDUST and YD, and δ refers to the company-level 




fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of 168 year dummies to represent the 169 sampled 
companies. 
Table 2 contains the results of fixed-effects regressions of DBLS on Q. First, to 
examine whether the DBLS is associated with Q, we regress Q on DBLS alone without 
the control variables using equation (1). Positive, but statistically insignificant impact of 
DBLS on Q is noticeable in Model 1 of Table 2. However, the coefficient on the constant 
term in Model 1 of Table 2 is statistically significant and appears to indicate that there 
may be omitted variables bias. Thus, we include the control variables in Model 2 so as to 
take into consideration potential omitted variables bias. Observably, the coefficient on 
DBLS remains positive, but statistically insignificant in Model 2 of Table 2, and thereby 
failing to provide support for H1 and the recommendations of King II, but consistent with 
the findings of prior studies (Weir and Laing, 2000; Sanda et al., 2010) that suggest that 
DBLS has no impact on market valuation.  
Second, and given that a high proportion (see Table 1) of our sample have a DBLS, its 
insignificance may be due to the limited variability in the sample. Therefore, to ascertain 
that our results are driven by this phenomenon, we split the sample into two sub-samples, 
firms with: DBLS with non-independent chairperson (DBLSWNIC) and (ii) DBLS with 
independent chairperson (DBLSWIC). As King II sets stricter tests for independent non-
executive directors than non-executive directors, such as not having professional, 
ownership, employment, family, supplier and customer connections (see King Report, 
2002, para. 2.4), independent chairpersons can be expected to be more effective at 
monitoring and disciplining unruly CEOs, and thus, a higher market valuation for firms 
with DBLSWIC than those with DBLSWNIC. We test this proposition by re-regressing 
equation (1) by replacing DBLS with: (i) DBLSWNIC and (ii) DBLSWIC, one at a time. 
Consistent with our prediction, positive, but statistically insignificant effect of 
DBLSWNIC2 on Q is noticeable in Model 3 of Table 2, whilst the coefficient on 
DBLSWIC in Models 4 and 5 are both positive and statistically significant, and thereby 
providing support for H1. The evidence also implies that it is the independence of the 
chairperson rather than the mere split of roles that can have a significant positive impact 
on market valuation. 
Theoretically, our results are consistent with agency theory that indicates that 
corporate boards with independent DBLS have increased capacity to effectively advise, 
monitor and discipline top management, and thereby enhancing market valuation (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Our evidence also provides support for both the 
recommendations of King II and the findings of previous studies (Rechner and Dalton, 
1991; Dahya et al., 1996) that report a positive association between DBLS and market 
valuation, but inconsistent with those that either report a negative (Boyd, 1995; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003) or no (Baliga et al., 1996; Bozec, 2005) association. 
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 We first re-regressed DBLSWNIC on Q alone with the results showing a similar positive, but statistically 
insignificant coefficient.   




Table 2. Fixed-effects regressions of dual board leadership structure on market valuation 
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4.254 
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-0.292 
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Notes: Coefficients are on top of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that a p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using 
the robust clustered standard errors technique. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s (Q), return on assets (ROA), total shareholder return (TSR), dual board leadership structure (DBLS), dual board 
leadership structure with non-independent chairperson (DBLSWNIC), dual board leadership structure with independent chairperson (DBLSWIC), predicted  DBLSWIBC (PRE_DBLSWIC) – obtained by 
regressing DBLSWIBC on the control variables and used as an instrument for the DBLSWIC in model 8, audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the presence of a corporate governance 
committee (CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), gearing (GEAR), government ownership (GOVOWN), firm size (LNTA), industry dummies (INDUST), and year dummies (YD). Table 1 above fully 
defines all the variables used. 




5.3 Robustness analyses 
Our fixed-effects regressions so far do not take into consideration alternative market 
valuation proxiess and other potential endogeneities, suggesting that the positive impact 
of DBLSWIC on Q, for example, may be spurious. In this subsection, we examine how 
robust our results are to the use of alternative market valuation measures and the 
presence of endogeneities.  
First, we investigate the robustness of our results to two alternative market valuation 
proxies that we have data on: return on assets (ROA – an accounting based measure) and 
total share returns (TSR – a market based proxy). Models 6 and 7 of Table 2 contain 
findings based on using ROA and TSR, respectively, instead of Q. Statistically 
significant and positive effect of DBLSWIC on ROA and TSR in models 6 and 7 of 
Table 2, respectively, is noticeable, and thereby suggesting that our findings are robust 
when an accounting (ROA) or a market (TSR) based proxy of valuation is utilised 
instead of Q. 
Second, to account for potential endogeneities that may be caused by omitted 
variable bias, we employ the widely used two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). However, to ensure that the 2SLS methodology is 
appropriate, and following Beiner et al. (2006), we first conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
exogeneity test (see Beiner et al., 2006: p.267) to test for the presence of an endogenous 
association between Q and DBLSWIC. Applied to equation (1), the test does not accept 
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, and therefore, we conclude that the 2SLS 
methodology may be ideal and that our fixed-effects findings may be spurious. In the 
first stage, we conjecture that the DBLSWIC will be influenced by all the control 
variables contained in equation (1). In the second stage, we utilise the predicted part of 
the DBLSWIC (PRE_DBLSWIC) as an instrument for DBLSWIC and re-regress 
equation (1) on as follows: 








ˆ εδββα                         
(2) 
where everything remains unchanged as specified in equation (1) except that we employ 
the predicted DBLSWIC (PRE_DBLSWIC) from the first-stage estimation as an 
instrument for the DBLSWIC. The coefficient on the PRE_DBLSWIC in Model 8 of 
Table 2 is positive and statistically significant, and thereby suggesting that our evidence 
of a positive effect of DBLSWIC on Q is robust to potential endogeneities that may arise 
from omitted variables. Overall, the robustness analyses suggest that our findings are 
not sensitive to different types of endogeneities and market valuation proxies.  
   
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
This paper examines the link between dual board leadership structure (DBLS) and 
market valuation using a sample 169 South African (SA) listed firms from 2002 to 
2007. This coincides with a period during which the SA authorities embarked on 
corporate governance policy reforms, which focused mainly on enhancing board 
independence and monitoring power in the form of the 1994 (King I) and 2002 (King II) 
King Reports. We find a significant positive link between DBLS and market valuation, 
but only in firms with independent chairpersons, implying that the market values firms 
with independent DBLS more highly. Our evidence provides support for both the 
recommendations of King II and the findings of previous studies (Rechner and Dalton, 
C.G. Ntim  Does the South African stock market… 
 
 44
1991; Dahya et al., 1996) that report a positive association between DBLS and market 
valuation, but inconsistent with those that either report a negative (Boyd, 1995; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003) or no (Baliga et al., 1996; Bozec, 2005) association. The findings are 
robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of market 
valuation proxies and endogeneity problems. Theoretically, the findings are consistent 
with agency theory, which suggests that independent DBLS increases the capacity of the 
board to effectively advise, monitor and discipline management, and thereby improving 
market valuation. Our evidence also has important regulatory and policy implications. 
The evidence that the market values only firms with independent DBLS implies that the 
SA authorities should focus more on encouraging firms to go beyond merely having 
DBLS to having independent DBLS, as recommended by King II.   
 
 
Acknowledgements. The author gratefully acknowledges useful and timely comments by 




Baliga, R.B., Moyer, C.R. and Rao, R.B. (1996) CEO duality and firm financial 
performance, Strategic Management Journal, 17, 41-53. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M.M., and Zimmermann, H. (2006) An integrated 
framework of corporate governance and firm valuation. European Financial 
Management, 12, 249-283. 
Boyd, B.K. (1995) CEO duality and firm performance: a contingency model, Strategic 
Management Journal, 16, 301-312. 
Bozec, R. (2005) Boards of directors, market discipline and firm performance, Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9-10), 1921-1960. 
Brickley, J.A., Coles, L. and Jarrell, G. (1997) Corporate leadership structure: on the 
separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 3, 189-220. 
Dahya, J., Lonie, A.A. and Power, D.M. (1996) The Case for separating the roles of 
chairman and CEO: an analysis of stock market and accounting data, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 4(2), 71-77. 
Donaldson, L. and Davis, (1991) Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns, Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49-64. 
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J.H. (1994) Boards and company performance – research 
challenges the conventional wisdom, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2, 151-160. 
Guest, P.M., (2009) The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the 
UK, European Journal of Finance, 15, 385-404.  
Gujarati, D.N. (2003) Basic econometrics. McGraw-Hill: New York. 
Henry, D. (2008) Corporate governance structure and the valuation of Australian firms: 
is there value in ticking the boxes. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35, 
912-942. 
Jensen, M.C. (1993) The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems, Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880. 
Kiel, G.C. and Nicholson, G.J. (2003) Board composition and corporate performance: 
how the Austrian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189-205. 
C.G. Ntim  Does the South African stock market… 
 
 45
King Committee. (1994 & 2002) King reports on corporate governance for South 
Africa. Institute of Directors, Johannesburg. 
Laing, D. and Weir, C.M. (1999) Governance structures, size and corporate 
performance in UK firms, Management Decisions, 37(5), 457-464. 
Lipton, M., and Lorsch, J. (1992) A modest proposal for improved corporate 
governance, Business Lawyer, 48, 59-77. 
Ntim C.G., Opong K.K., and Danbolt, J. (2012) The value relevance of shareholder 
versus stakeholder corporate governance disclosure policy reforms in South Africa. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(1), 84-105. 
Ntim C.G., Opong K.K., Danbolt, J., and Thomas, D.A. (2011) Voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures by post-apartheid South African corporations. Journal of 
Applied Accounting Research, forthcoming. 
Ntim, C.G. (2011) The King reports, independent non-executive directors and firm 
valuation on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Corporate Ownership and Control, 
9(1), 428-440. 
Ntim, C.G. (2012) An integrated corporate governance framework and financial 
performance in South African listed corporations. South African Journal of 
Economics, forthcoming. 
Ntim, C.G. and Osei, K.A. (2011) The impact of corporate board meetings on corporate 
performance in South Africa. African Review of Economics and Finance, 2(2), 83-
103. 
Ntim, C.G., (2009) Internal corporate governance and firm financial performance 
evidence from South African listed firms. PhD thesis, University of Glasgow. 
Petersen, M.A. (2009) Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 435-480. 
Rechner, P.L. and Dalton, D.R. (1991) CEO duality and organizational performance: a 
longitudinal analysis, Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155-160. 
Rhoades, D.L., Rechner, P.L. and Sudramurthy, C. (2001) A meta-analysis of board 
directorship structure and financial performance: are “two heads better than one?  
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9, 311-319. 
Sanda, A., Mikailu, A.S. and Garba, T. (2010) Corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm financial performance in Nigeria, Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting, 
2(1), 22-39. 
Vafeas, N. and Theodorou, E. (1998) The relationship between board structure and firm 
performance in the UK, British Accounting Review, 30, 383-407. 
Weir C., Laing, D. and McKnight, P.J. (2002) Internal and external governance 
mechanisms: their impact on the performance of large UK public companies’, Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting, 29(5), 579-611. 
Weir, C. and Laing, D. (2000) The performance-governance relationship: the effects of 
Cadbury compliance on UK quoted companies, Journal of Management and 
Governance, 4, 265-281. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2010) Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT 
Press: Massachusetts. 
 
